| Re: [leshan-dev] LwM2M bootstrapping purpose |
I think having any of the the two sets of credentials (DM & BS) being stolen can result in a large amount of damage being done, depending on your particular use case at hand. Being able to invalidate the credentials from the back end side provides means to protect against misuse of stolen credentials (if you are able to detect the leakage of them). However, the real difference is the effort that needs to spent in order to remedy the situation. DM: quite easy, i.e. can be done from the BS server. BS: may be hard, requires other means of accessing the device (which is not covered by LWM2M).
Thanks Pierre-Henri. Every query is covered. I was missing the part on
the ability to rotate bootstrap credentials. I had wrongly assumed
that only, DM credentials could be rotated.
Also, I now assume we can afford to have DM credentials stolen, since
that could easily be rotated. A stolen DM credential will only result
in temporarily leakage/damage of data. But we cannot afford to have BS
credentials stolen as that will lead to permanent leakage/damage to
data and then will need a person to physically set the BS credentials
again. Is that a wrong assumption ?
On 4/20/16, Pierre-Henri Trivier <phtrivier@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> There are two sets of credentials :
>
> - the "LwM2M server credentials" (also called "device management", or DM
> credentials)
> - the "LwM2M bootstrap server credentials" (let's call them "bootstrap
> credentials", or BS credentials - no profanity intended).
>
> It is possible to rewrite BS credentials on a device, at bootstrap time,
> so you can rotate both set of credentials.
>
> From my understanding, if BS credentials are stolen for a device, both
> the BS server and DM server should invalidate credentials for this device.
>
> Neither the "real" device nor the masquerading device will be able to
> communicate, until you "physically" set new BS credentials on the "real"
> device.
>
> I would say the situation is akin to getting your primary email password
> stolen ; an attacker can use it to get all your other account's
> passwords (social media, other emails, etc...), or reset them. Not much
> you can do unless contacting other services and get new credentials.
>
> The bottom line is clearly : don't get BS or DM credentials stolen, and
> rotate them ;)
>
> Or am I missing something ?
>
> On 19/04/2016 19:05, Kiran Pradeep wrote:
>> I tried reading post(in medium) by Julien Vermillard on bootstrapping.
>> But I couldn't understand the exact problem it was trying to solve.
>> Julien in comments mentioned about rotating keys which I couldn't
>> understand and so posting here. Kindly guide to appropriate forum in
>> case this list, takes only development related queries only.
>>
>> I understood the point of invalidating LwM2M server credentials so
>> that new keys could be issued if LwM2M server keys are stolen. But
>> what if bootstrap credentials itself are stolen ? Then the rogue
>> entity, could easily ask the bootstrap server for LwM2M credentials
>> and do what ever it feels like. The bootstrap keys is going to have to
>> be fixed for the device lifetime, since they are written in factory
>> itself. What is the point I am missing ?
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Kiran.
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>
> --
> Pierre-Henri Trivier
> AirVantage Software Engineer
> phtrivier@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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> Fax : +33(0)5 61 00 51 46
>
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