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Re: [equinox-dev] OSGi for Server-side...


Just as an idea and testing the reactions... :-)

We can look at solving the problem... or we can look at avoiding the problem.
One possible way to avoid the problem is not use the JRE URL subsystem.
I don't have all the details worked out, but just the overall idea...

For this to work, we would have to weave/refactor class files at deployment or loading time.
We would need our own URL framework that is binary compatible with the JRE one,
or with a straight mapping (like straightforward refactoring). This means that no one would be
using the JRE URL framework, although they think they are.

This would always allow us to have control over the URLStreamHandlerFactory
It would be our own. For all code executing within the OSGi environment (bundles).
This would require having some access to the other jars as well... so that they can be
woven as well. Only the JRE rt.jar and the like would be left alone.

Any reaction?
Do we have other similar issues that could be addressed through bytecode weaving?
 
Best regards,

Olivier Gruber, Ph.D.
Persistent & Distributed Object Platforms and Frameworks
IBM TJ Watson Research Center




Thomas Watson/Austin/IBM@IBMUS
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10/25/2005 03:46 PM
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> On Tuesday 25 October 2005 14:28, Kaegi, Simon wrote:
> > 1) Running when someone else has set the URL and URLConnection singletons
> > needed by the URLHandlerService - patched but needs polishing
>
> Big problem without co-operation from the "conflictee". However, more
> importantly, how about when loading many Equinox instances in the same JVM,
> and resolving the URLHandler issue across those... Richard hall is sketching
> on this problem, and I think collaboration is a good thing here.


Yes collaboration is good here.  I have spent time discussing this problem
and possible solutions with Richard Hall.  The current solution Richard
is implementing in Felix is likely the best we can do for this situation.

Unfortunately the solutions is pretty complex and I would definitely only want

to enable it if more than one framework is running in the VM.


There is still a problem with Richard's solution, because it still assumes
the Framework can set the singleton URLStreamHandlerFactory for the VM.  In
Simon's case we want the core framework to still function

when setting the URLStreamHandlerFactory fails and therefore the
URLHandlerService is unavailable.


> > 2) Using the Conditional Permission Admin Service when someone else has set
> > the SecurityManager. - avoided this so far but it's an important
> > consideration in some server-side environments - without control of the
> > SecurityManager we lose the capability to do postponed decisions (?) - What
> > are the repercussions? Is there something we can do about it?
>
> Two things comes to mind;
>
>  1. User can specify the SecurityManager from commandline, and if an
> application doesn't do the selective setting of the SM, then that is a bug.
> If you can convince the deployment team that the SM from Equinox does a
> better job than the "default" one, then mission accompilshed. (provided the
> technical difficulties to have the SM separated out bla bla bla...)


Here are the technical difficulties:

- The SecurityManager specified at commandline must be available on the
application classloader or its parent classloaders (i.e. ext, boot).

When Equinox is launched the code for the framework is loaded with a separate

classloader (not the app classloader) so it's security manager cannot
be specified at commandline.

- Moving the FrameworkSecurityManager out of the core framework.  This has

issues because it uses some core OSGi interfaces
(e.g. org.osgi.service.condpermadmin.Condition).  These classes would also

have to be separated from the framework.  This is not good situation IMO.


>  2. If the deployer decides to stick with the default security,
> shouldn't this
> "just work" for Equinox as well?? Not sure, what to put in the security
> policy codebase URLs, but shouldn't be impossible.


OSGi actually assumes complete control here.  Each bundle in OSGi has a single

ProtectionDomain.  This ProtectionDomain is controlled by the Framework
and dictates what permissions a class loaded from a bundle will have.  When

the Framework defines a class it specifies the correct bundle ProtectionDomain

depending on what bundle the class bytes came form.  The bundle
ProtectionDomain uses a policy to assign permissions based on input from the

PermissionAdmin and ConditionalPermissionAdmin services defined by the OSGi

specification.  No other policy is used to assign permissions to a bundle's

ProtectionDomain.  Regardless of what SecurityManager is used the
ProtectionDomain for the Class being check is what defines the permissions
a particular class gets granted.


The only reason a "special" FrameworkSecurityManager is needed is to process
postponed conditions correctly.  In Equinox we detect this situation and
treat all postponed conditions as non-postponed conditions if the
SecurityManager is not our own "special" implementation.  What we have to
decide is if we care about postponed conditions in the scenarios we
are trying to run in.


>
> Cheers
> Niclas


Tom.
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